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Abstract
We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand
uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry.
Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the
performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same
information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both
information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly
different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers
the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical
arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices
and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce
technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.
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Liberalization in utility industries began in the 1980s and gained speed and complexity
throughout the 1990s. Around the world the process has involved a movement away from
centralized planning of infrastructure and supply towards more market based principles
for guiding agents’ interactions. Some of the most diverse market organizations have
arisen in the electricity industry where governments, regulators and industry participants
have recognized the myriad of intricate details that must be reconciled in order to make
decentralized trading efficient. However, one of the important aspects that is often
overlooked is the possible interaction between information asymmetries among
heterogeneous sellers and the rules governing the market.
In this paper we use laboratory experiments to study the outcomes of uniform price and
discriminatory price call-auctions when different sellers are asymmetrically informed
about market demand. These two institutions are natural choices for our purpose as they
correspond to the auction formats most closely related to the actual institutions used in
electricity spot markets (i.e., power pools and balancing mechanisms). The two
remuneration schemes, uniform and discriminatory, represent two alternative ways of
paying generators who are scheduled to operate in a given period of the day.
In many respects daily demand changes are predictable, yet something as simple as a
popular football match can raise demand enough to necessitate more capacity than
estimated a day in advance. In the England and Wales market the estimation that was
once done primarily by the transmission operator and owner, National Grid Company, is
now a more decentralized activity performed largely at the company level. Some
companies have claimed that human resources have increased four-fold in their
information technology departments to accommodate new trading and demand estimation
requirements under NETA.1
Electricity industries are characterized by a mix of agent types. Agents range from the
owner of a single small generation station, to the vertically integrated generation-plus-
supply company, to the multi-utility with ownership of generation and supply assets in
addition to interest in gas and trading companies. As Kahn et al. (2001) suggest, the
resource burden of demand estimation will vary among firms. Information gathering may
be more costly for smaller less integrated companies, for example, and knowing the
implications of this is important in a world where it is politically and environmentally
desirable to encourage certain agent types (e.g., renewables and combined-heat and
power) to remain in the market.
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 “How well is NETA doing,” Regulation Initiative Workshop, London Business School, October 17, 2001.
2Informational asymmetries have differential consequences for generator types more
generally because of the relationship between costs and running time. High cost
generators produce less often and their profitability is greatly influenced by realized
demand levels. If informational differences among these types of sellers have divergent
consequences under alternative market institutions this will have consequences for
overall market efficiency and seller profitability. It is this situation that our experiments
best describe. Our main finding is that in treatments with asymmetric information the
uniform price auction is more efficient than the discriminatory auction. The relative
inefficiency of the discriminatory auction is not due to higher average prices but instead
to higher marginal or cut-off prices. These higher cut-off prices benefit the high cost
generators who obtain more profits relative to the uniform treatment. We also find some
indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform
auctions but this result is not significant.
2. Background
Because of the complexity and diversity of energy markets there is a general lack of
understanding about which factors are most important for achieving a sustainable
competitive market. The influence of certain factors is rather clear; for instance, surplus
transmission and generation capacity are considered as highly desirable in so far as they
improve security of supply and better enable the monitoring of dominant players'
behavior. Some other issues are less well understood. For instance, how should
generators be paid for the power they sell? One approach is to pay all generators the same
per unit price (equivalent to the bid of the most expensive station required to meet
demand); another is to pay each generator its own bid price for the power it sells.
The choice between uniform and discriminatory bidding rules was discussed and heatedly
debated in the England and Wales market after the government along with the industry
regulator announced a review of the electricity trading arrangements in 1997. The power
pool and associated uniform clearing price which had been in place since the industry
was privatized in 1990 were to be replaced with bilateral contract markets and a last
minute balancing mechanism to reconcile demand and supply differences. These new
rules, which have become known as the New Electricity Trading Arrangements or
NETA, came into effect on March 27, 2001.2 The uniform price of the former pool has
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 See Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer, 1998) for discussions of the review process and Offer (1999)
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3been replaced with discriminatory prices in the contract markets as well as in the
balancing mechanism. 3   
A similar debate over payment rules arose in California when in November 2000 a panel
of renowned economists was commissioned to comment on whether or not California
should switch from uniform pricing in the Power Exchange to pay-bid (i.e.,
discriminatory) pricing. The California panel unanimously favored a uniform price. They
stated that:
“...our response is that the expectation behind the proposal to shift from
uniform to as-bid pricing- that it would provide purchasers of electric
power substantial relief from the soaring prices of electric power such as
they have recently experienced- is simply mistaken.” (Kahn et al. (2001),
p2)
The panel claimed that the use of pay-bid would weaken competition in generation,
impede capacity expansion, and result in inefficient dispatch. These conclusions are at
least partly based on the fact that profitability under discriminatory pricing is contingent
on generators’ ability to predict the marginal price (which depends on demand), and that
this ability will vary among firms. In England and Wales and in California the policy
makers and consumer groups who favored discriminatory remuneration argued on the
basis of similar expectations. Relative to uniform prices they expected: reduced market
power, lower consumer prices, reduced collusion potential, and reduced price volatility.
Green and McDaniel (1999) model the two payment schemes in the context of the
England and Wales market. Using a two-stage model with forward and spot trading they
first derive a revenue-equivalence result for the spot market,4 but secondly they show that
bidding strategies require more information about quantities contracted in forward rounds
under the discriminatory method. They conclude that this could disadvantage smaller or
entrant agents.
The issue we are interested in, the interaction between information asymmetries and
market institutions, is difficult to quantify on the basis of information from the field as
measures of such informational differences require data that is commercially confidential,
strategic and potentially highly subjective. However, using laboratory experiments the
importance of information can still be addressed, since we can separately study
environments with different market institutions and different information conditions.
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 Approximately 95% of electricity trades in England and Wales are now via bilateral contracts between
retail suppliers and generators. Trading in the balancing mechanism accounts for the remainder of trades
and this trading is conducted by the System Operator, National Grid Company. “Last minute” is actually
3½ hours prior to real time.
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 With single unit demands, Vickrey’s (1961) revenue equivalence theorem predicts this result.
4Hence, experiments may help to curtail the political and financial expenses of
deregulation by uncovering potential distortions in proposed market designs before they
are enacted.
3. Previous Experimental Studies
Experimentalists’ interest in the electricity industry is growing but there are so far only a
few available papers on this theme. Several papers have arisen from consulting projects
in Arizona, and other groups are currently delving into this topic.
Some of this research has focused on factors that mitigate market power (e.g., Rassenti,
Smith and Wilson (2000)) with significant interest spawning from events in the England
and Wales market, particularly NETA (e.g., Rassenti, Smith and Wilson (2001), and
Staropoli et al. (2000)). Rassenti et al. (2000) found that market power is associated with
high and variable prices, but this outcome can be neutralized with demand side bidding.
Efficiency in their design approached 100 percent in treatments combining demand side
bidding and no market power. As in Rassenti et al. (2000), Rassenti et al. (2001) use a
network design with 3 nodes and sellers located at different points on the network. They
find that, relative to uniform price auctions, the discriminatory auction results in higher
(though less volatile) prices and less efficiency. Prices observed in the discriminatory
auction without market power were as high as a uniform price auction with market
power. In their experiment sellers had full supply side information (capacity, sellers’
marginal costs and network positions), but demand was unknown to all subjects.
Using the England and Wales market as a reference, Staropoli et al. (2000) consider an
environment in which sellers can behave strategically with respect to both price bids and
quantity bids. In the latter case, firms withhold some of their capacity from the market in
efforts to drive up prices. Using a uniform price auction, they find substantial mark-ups
and inefficient dispatch in treatments with and without market power, and individual
efforts to withhold capacity to increase prices were not successful in either case.
With multi-unit demand auctions, it is difficult to make general theoretical statements
comparing auction institutions. This is summed up well by Ausubel and Cramton (1998),
“Considering the twin objectives of allocative efficiency and revenue maximization, we
find that the ranking [between uniform and discriminatory auction] is inherently
ambiguous... the choice ought to be viewed as an empirical question that depends on the
actual nature of demands.” Experiments seem to confirm this conclusion.5 Smith (1967)
is one of the first experimental papers to compare discriminatory and uniform price
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 In the less industry-specific literature on multi-unit auctions typically buyers rather than sellers are the
bidders.
5auctions. Using treasury auctions as a context and allowing each bidder to demand two
units he finds that bidding behavior is more volatile in the uniform price auction.
Revenues in the experiments depended on the proportion of rejected bids; if the
proportion was ‘low to moderate’, the uniform auction produced higher revenues. Miller
and Plott (1985) find that prices are typically near the competitive equilibrium in both
uniform and discriminatory-price auctions. Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1996) allow pre-
play communication between the bidders before the auction and find that collusive (low
revenue) outcomes are more likely to arise in a uniform than in a discriminatory price
auction. On the other hand, Abbink, Brandts, and Pezanis-Christou (2002), studying a
common value setting, detect a revenue advantage for the uniform auction over the
discriminatory format.6
To our knowledge none of the existing studies tackles an environment with asymmetric
information on market demand. In the present paper, we compare the two most prominent
trading mechanisms, the uniform price auction, which can be seen as a stylized version of
the former Pool in England and Wales, and the discriminatory auction, which has been
discussed in connection with the reform of the electricity trading institutions in California
and is used in the balancing mechanism under NETA. Both mechanisms we study
involve one-sided bidding, where the demand side is computerized and represented by
demand functions.7
4. Experimental Design
Our goal was to design an environment simple enough to allow experimentation, but
which captures the most important features characterizing the environment of an
electricity trading institution.8 Below we describe and discuss these design choices in
detail.
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 Different set-ups are discussed in Alsemgeest, Noussair, and Olson (1998), Kagel and Levin (2001), and
Manelli Sefton and Wilner (2000). In the former two, revenue rankings and effeciency losses can be partly
attributed to the incentives in multi-unit auctions for demand reduction.
7
 One of the goals of NETA was to introduce more demand-side participation. Retailers enter into contracts
with generators in the bilateral markets and can participate in the balancing mechanism. So far demand-side
participation in the balancing mechanism has been very limited.
8We do not incorporate line constraints or market power (both of which are important characteristics of
electricity industries) because we want to focus solely on the influence of information differences under the
two auction mechanisms. The interaction of line constraints and/or market power with informational
asymmetries might well lead to different results, and we view this as an interesting topic for future
research.
64.1. Costs, Demand, and Information Settings
In the absence of contractual obligations that influence running decisions, a station’s
start-up costs are a primary determinant of desired load, i.e., the proportion of hours
throughout the day that a station would like to generate. The high cost of restarting a
nuclear plant makes it attractive to run them almost continuously throughout the day and
these stations are unlikely to set the price of electricity unless demand is exceptionally
low. At the other extreme are open-cycle-gas-turbines which can be turned on according
to the level of demand at intervals within the day. Start-up costs comprise an element of a
plant’s ‘avoidable costs’; these are not fixed costs for a station because they are not
incurred if there is no production. An operator incurs the full start-up costs if any units
are produced at all (i.e., the cost is the same if the station produces one unit or all units up
to capacity), but no costs if production is zero; This is the interpretation of avoidable
costs offered by Telser (1978) and the one which we adopt for our experiments. Sellers
incur only avoidable and marginal costs in our design.
The higher the demand in a period, the more expensive are the marginal cost of stations
required to generate in those periods. In each of our experimental groups there are always
two low cost and two high cost sellers, and subjects remained the same type throughout
the experiment. Costs were chosen to qualitatively mimic baseload versus peakload
generators in the electricity industry. Baseload generators have high avoidable costs and
low marginal costs while peakload generators have low avoidable costs and high
marginal costs.
The total cost structure for the two generator types is shown in Table 1. Each seller has 4
units she can sell in each period: baseload sellers have avoidable costs of 13, two units
with marginal costs of 1, and two with marginal costs of 5; peakload sellers have an
avoidable cost of 4, two units with marginal cost of 21 and two units with marginal costs
of 23.9
In the presence of avoidable costs the technically optimal way of sharing the production
of different total output levels among different production units does not simply
correspond to the ordering of the marginal cost levels. Rather, one has to consider the
cost structure as a whole. For the cost structure used in our experiment, the optimal
allocations are as shown in table 2. The second and third column of the table show how
the quantities should be allocated to the two firms within either of the two categories of
baseload and peakload producers. For instance, a quantity of 6 units is optimally
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 In the instructions subjects were only given total cost information. We feel that this is the most natural
way of presenting cost information. Marginal and average costs could easily be inferred from the total cost
table, but were not given explicitly. Nevertheless, in the presence of avoidable costs a sound bidding
strategy on the basis of marginal costs is not straightforward. An English translation of the instructions can
be found in Appendix I.
7produced by one of the baseload producers producing 4 units and the other 2 or,
alternatively, both of them producing 3 units, with both peakload producers producing
nothing.10 Observe that optimal scheduling sometimes requires a rather high degree of
coordination. For example, if between 9 and 11 units are sold, only one of two identical
peakload producers can produce and if 4 or fewer units are sold, only one producer is
active.
Table 1: Avoidable, Total,  and Marginal and Average costs for each seller type*
Baseload Peakload
Units AvoiC TC MC AC AvoiC TC MC AC
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 13 14 14 14 4 25 25 25
2 13 15 1 7.5 4 46 21 23
3 13 20 5 6.67 4 69 23 23
4 13 25 5 6.25 4 92 23 23
* AvoiC stands for avoidable cost, TC for total cost, MC for marginal cost and AC for
average cost.
The supply function derived from the firms’ cost functions exhibits also some non-
standard features. In the presence of avoidable costs, the supply function cannot be
straightforwardly obtained by plotting the marginal cost function. Rather, the total supply
for a given price needs to be taken directly from computing the maximal number of units
that firms are willing to sell at that price.11 The lowest price at which a positive quantity
can profitably be sold is 6.25, as this is the lowest possible price that covers the average
production costs at any quantity. At 6.25, both baseload producers are willing to sell all
their units, i.e. a total of 8. Notice that no seller would be willing to sell less than his full
capacity. At prices above 6.25, the baseload producers may be willing to sell fewer units,
but still the maximum quantity they would offer is 8. The next highest price at which
more than 8 units can profitably be sold is 23, at which both peakload producers are
willing to sell all their units. At all prices above 23 the supply is also 16, since all firms
produce profitably at their capacity limits. Thus, we obtain the supply curve as depicted
in figure 1.
The shape of the demand curve in our design is very similar to Rassenti, Smith, and
Wilson (2000); there is a sizeable inelastic portion of demand at a high price of 100 with
two “interruptible” steps at 55 and 30. Each of these steps corresponds to 2 units. This
downward sloping demand curve captures some of the essential features of the industry
demand. The “steps” on the demand curve always remain the same and are known by all
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 This representation is like the one used by Van Boening and Wilcox (1996).
8producers. In contrast, the inelastic portion, which we refer to as X, is stochastic. The
elasticity of demand for electricity is very low and as such could be represented
vertically without loss of generality. However, a downward sloping though still inelastic
demand curve better represents actual circumstances: very larger consumers have fairly
predictable demands and are willing to be interrupted when prices rise, but residential
demands are more volatile. The value of X varies randomly each period between 5 and
10, so maximum demand varies with any value between 9 and 14, inclusive, with the
same probability of being chosen.12 Figure 1 shows the demand configuration for the
minimum and maximum basic demand (X = 5 and X=10).



























































































* In brackets are alternative schedules with the same minimal costs
When players are asymmetrically informed about demand, this asymmetry is with respect
to X. Low cost sellers know the value of X each period with certainty while high cost
sellers are given a noisy signal.13 Because of the relative cost structures, low cost
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 Demand on a typical winter day in England and Wales ranges approximately between 30 and 50 GW.
Our demand range from 9 to 14 represents this relationship between seasonal minimum and maximum
demand; i.e., minimum demand is approximately 0.6 times maximum demand. The experiment necessarily
exaggerates demand fluctuations over short periods, however. The amount of spare capacity in our design
(14 percent) is broadly in line with much of Europe.
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 We could have chosen to have one informed baseload and one informed peakload seller but because
baseload sellers should always be able to sell their units for any level of demand in our design, their
profitability is less sensitive to demand information than for peakload sellers. Thus, we believe this design
is more informative.
9generators should always want to run and are generally less sensitive to realized demand.
We, therefore, chose to always have them perfectly informed.
Figure 1: Supply and demand curve under minimum and maximum X configuration
In our asymmetric information settings, peakload sellers receive a noisy estimate of
demand in each period. There are two demand signals: high (X is between 8 and 10) and
low (X is between 5 and 7). A high signal means there is an 80% chance that demand is
between 8 and 10 (20% that it is between 5 and 7) while a low signal means an 80 (20)%
chance that it is between 5 and 7 (8 and 10).  We believe that this is an attractive means
of creating noise as one avoids the boundary problems inherent in methods that draw
random signals from uniform distributions over a small interval. Additionally, it is very
easy to explain to subjects.
We also run a control condition in which all sellers receive full demand information. In
all conditions subjects were allowed to submit bids below their costs as well as to
withhold units.
4.2.  Our treatments and the conduct of the experiment
For each of the two auction institutions - uniform (Uni) and discriminatory (Dis) - there
are 2 experimental treatments: complete demand information (Comp) and asymmetric
demand information (Asym).14 Each session consisted of 30 consecutive repetitions
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(rounds). By letting subjects play many rounds, we made sure that they had the
opportunity to gain experience; this seems especially important because the participants
in electricity markets are typically experienced professionals. The feedback between
rounds included:  market price (Uni) or cut-off price (Dis), number of units sold by each
of the three competitors , the value of X,  own revenue, own costs, and own profits. In the
discriminatory treatment subjects were told their own units sold and the associated sell
prices; competitors’ bids and sell prices were not revealed (only the number of units
sold).
To reflect the repeated game characteristic of interaction in these market institutions, the
same subjects played in the same market throughout the session. We will refer to such a
set of subjects as a group. We ran 8 experimental sessions with 16 subjects each. For
each treatment there are 8 independent groups of four sellers.15 Subjects were told the
number of subjects in their group and that they would remain in the same group for all 30
rounds of the experiment. For anonymity reasons, however, subjects were not told with
whom of the 15 other session participants they were grouped. The full experimental
design is shown in Table 3.
To keep the treatments comparable and to control for sampling errors, we used the same
samples of demand realizations in all four treatments. The demand parameter was
independently drawn for each round. Each sample was used for one group in each cell,
i.e. the realizations of the demand were the same, round by round, for one group of each
of the four conditions. We refer to such a set of demand realizations as a set-up.
Table 3: The four cells of the
experimental design
Uni Dis
Comp (4; 8; 30) (4; 8; 30)
Asym (4; 8; 30) (4; 8; 30)
in brackets: number of (sellers per group;
independent groups; auction rounds) in
each treatment
The experiment was conducted in the Laboratori d’Economia Experimental (LeeX) of
the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. The software for the experiment was
developed using the RatImage programming package (Abbink and Sadrieh (1995)).
                                                                                                                                                                            
typically used in the markets we are interested in (e.g., this corresponds to the system marginal price in the
former Pool in England and Wales).
15
 We can treat the individual groups as independent as there is no interaction between subjects of different
groups.
11
Subjects were recruited by public advertisement in the Department of Economics and
were mostly economics students. Each subject was allowed to participate in only one
session. In each session, four markets were run in parallel.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were granted a capital balance of 200 talers to
which gains were added and from which losses were subtracted. The total earnings of a
subject from participating in this experiment were equal to his capital balance plus the
sum of all the profits he made during the experiment minus the sum of his losses. A
session lasted approximately 2 hours (this includes the time spent to read the
instructions). At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their total earnings
anonymously in cash. Because peakload firms had much higher marginal costs than the
baseload firms, different conversion rates were used for both types of players. Peakload
subjects were rewarded with 4 pesetas per taler, while baseload subjects received one
peseta per taler earned in the experiment. Subjects earned on average 2793 Spanish
pesetas which is considerably higher than the students’ regular wage. 100 pesetas are
equivalent to 0.602 euros. At the time of the experiment, the exchange rates to the US
dollar and the British pound were approximately $ 0.55 and £ 0.37 for 100 pesetas.
5. Results
Since bidders in electricity trading institutions are experienced professionals who interact
with each other over many auctions, we are particularly interested in the market outcomes
and the subjects’ bidding behavior towards the end of the experiment. Therefore, we
focus our attention on the second half of the experiment (rounds 16-30). The raw data are
available from the authors upon request.
Recall that groups constitute the independent observations in our experiment since
bidders in the same market interact with each other and are very likely to influence each
other’s behavior. Therefore, statistical tests that require independence of observations can
only be applied on the group level. We test for differences between any two treatments in
the following manner. First, we compute the respective test statistic (e.g. the price level)
for the single groups. Then, we compute the difference between the two groups that have
used the same set of realizations of demand. We then apply the non-parametric binomial
test to the eight differences from the eight pairs of observations. This test is very simple
to apply: The null hypothesis presupposes that there is no treatment difference and thus
the two observations using the same set of demand realizations should, in expectation,
have the same test statistic. Differences are solely due to random sampling variations,
thus a greater or smaller test statistic for the observation of one or the other treatment is
equally likely. Under the null hypothesis, we should observe positive or negative
treatment differences in about the same number of observations, and the probability to
12
observe seven or eight positive (negative, respectively) differences should occur with a
probability lower than 5%. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis when we observe
seven or eight observations with a positive (negative, respectively) difference at a
significance level of α = 0.05 (one-sided).
5.1. Market prices
Figure 2 plots the evolution of average market prices over the thirty rounds of the
experiment; the term ‘market prices’ refers to the prices actually paid. In the early rounds
of the uniform auction, the average price is well above 30, the highest price at which all
the demand is served, indicating that the split of the total surplus is strongly in favor of
sellers. However, as subjects become experienced, competition starts having its effect.
With increasing experience, we observe market prices quickly falling and ending up
below 30. In the discriminatory design, the evolution of average prices takes a quite
different path, with prices starting from a much lower level and falling only gently. When
subjects are more experienced, however, no substantial differences can be identified
between the treatments anymore.
Figure 2
Figure 3 shows the average market prices for the second half of the experiment,
separately for the independent observations in the four treatments. Recall that there is
always one observation in each treatment matched to one observation in another
treatment using the same set of realizations of the basic demand. In no pair wise
comparison between two treatments do we observe seven or more average prices of one














treatment being greater than their counterparts in the other treatment using the same set-
up. Thus, the binomial test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no treatment differences
for any of the pair wise comparisons.
Figure 3
As mentioned, there is a strong tendency towards prices below 30 in the data. The
competitive price range – as can be seen from the demand and supply curves depicted in
figure 1 – does not change with the basic demand X.16 Nevertheless, we observe that
average prices tend to be slightly higher when demand is higher. Figure 4 shows the
average price as a function of the basic demand, for the aggregate data of each condition
separately. Thus, bidding behavior seems to be not so competitive that it would rule out
any mark-ups in high demand situations.17
5.2. Price volatility
Besides average market prices, the choice of an auction procedure may also affect the
volatility of prices over time. In our experiment, we measure volatility by the standard
deviation of the average price over the second 15 rounds. We do not find evidence for a
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23, and a peakload producer happens to sell only one unit, it would face a small loss. Notice that in the pay-
bid auction, bidders can nevertheless make losses if their bids are too low.
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 Notice that these data lack the necessary requirements to apply statistical tests. Firstly, the observations
for different X are not independent from one another. Secondly, different X values may be drawn at
different rounds of the experiment, such that effects of X variations on prices may interfere with general























Our primary result from these experiments is that the discriminatory auction is
significantly less efficient than the uniform auction when there is asymmetric
information. Figure 5 shows the total surplus in the last 15 rounds of the four treatments
by subject group. The total surplus is defined as the sum of the consumers’ valuations for
the sold units minus the total production costs incurred by all sellers together.18 In fact, in
all eight set-ups the uniform auction scores a higher surplus than the discriminatory
auction in the corresponding market, in the presence of asymmetric information. The
same comparison for the control condition with full information does not yield a
significant difference.
Efficiency losses may arise from different sources. As we have seen, the average market
prices are relatively similar in both institutions. However, while in the uniform auction all
scheduled sellers pay the same price, the discriminatory auction assigns different prices to
different units, such that some prices may well be higher than the unique price would be
in the uniform auction mechanism. This, in turn, may induce a tendency towards higher
cut-off prices. Higher cut-off prices can reduce the efficiency score since they tend to
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X, and 30 for units exceeding X + 2.
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lead to a lower quantity being sold in the auction. Thus, not all economically possible
surplus is extracted from the market.
Figure 5
Another possible source of efficiency loss incurred in the discriminatory auction may be
the displacement of baseload by peakload generators undercutting their bids (possibly
inadvertently since a peakload producer might be bidding on the expectation of a low
demand signal whilst the baseload producer knows demand will be high). While in the
uniform auction baseload generators can generally make sure to be scheduled by
submitting low bids (still being reasonably confident that the market price is eventually
determined by peakload bidders when the demand level is sufficient), they face a much
harder task in the discriminatory design. In the latter case, decreasing their bids down to
their cost level would slash their profit margins to zero. In order to ensure significant
profits, they must try not to undercut the bids of the peakload generators too drastically.
This response to discriminatory mechanisms may augment the likelihood of
displacements, i.e., incidences in which baseload generators are outbid by peakload
generators even though the former could produce at much lower costs.
To disentangle these two possible sources of inefficiency, we need to look at both effects
separately. Figure 6 shows that in the asymmetric information treatment, in which we
observe a significantly lower efficiency in the discriminatory than in the uniform auction,
cut-off prices are indeed significantly higher under the pay-bid scheme. This is observed
in 7 of the 8 set-ups which is significant at α = 0.05 (one-sided), according to the




















significant. The higher cut-off prices result in a significantly lower quantity produced
(recall that the demand function has a step at the price of 30). In the last fifteen rounds of
Asym-Uni, on average 0.35 units less are sold per period than would be efficient, while
the corresponding “loss” for Asym-Dis is 0.89. In all five set-ups in which there is a
difference between the two observations, the number is higher under the discriminatory
format (three set-ups exhibit the same figure for both conditions). This difference is
significant at α = 0.05 (one-sided), according to the binomial test. In the control
conditions with full information, the figures are 0.39 for Comp-Uni and 0.54 for Comp-
Dis. Here the difference is not significant.
Figure 6
On the other hand, our data do not provide conclusive evidence for more displacements in
the discriminatory format. We may define the loss in technical efficiency as the
difference between the realized total costs and the minimal costs that would have been
incurred by the four firms altogether if they had produced the given number of units in
the technically optimal schedule. These losses include losses through displacements of
baseload generators and, to a lesser extent, losses that occur when production is not
optimally allocated within one type of producers (e.g. optimal allocation may require that
one peakload seller produces 4 and the other 0, but the actual constellation is that one
produces 3 and the other 1 so then we get a (small) loss in technical efficiency).
Indeed, the loss in technical efficiency is on average higher in the discriminatory auction
than with the uniform auction design, both in the asymmetric information condition (30.7




















However, based on the independent observations for the eight set-ups we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no difference, in either of the two information conditions. The
differences between the information conditions also point in the expected direction, with
technical efficiency losses greater under asymmetric information, but this is also
insignificant.
We obtain the analogous result if we look at the number of displacements, without
accounting for the cost consequences. On average over the last 15 rounds, 1.36 units are
displaced in Asym-Uni, while in Asym-Dis 1.68 units are scheduled to the “wrong”
producer. In the control treatment, the corresponding numbers are 1.02 in Comp-Uni and
1.42 in Comp-Dis. Neither of these differences, however, is statistically significant.
To summarize, when there are informational asymmetries among sellers the
discriminatory auction proves less efficient than the uniform auction. This reduced
efficiency derives primarily from market prices that are more peaky resulting in reduced
total surplus. While the volatility of prices are not significantly different, this ‘upside’
price risk in the discriminatory auction is a feature which increases the regulatory burden
of insuring that prices remain below given thresholds.19 Although these price spikes wash
out on average, they can have implications for suppliers selling retail under regulated
prices but having to buy substantial power in the spot market. In England and Wales
retail price controls are to be lifted from April 2002 implying that, in areas where retail
competition is weak, high spot prices can be passed on to domestic consumers.
5.4. Profitability
When bidders have only imprecise and insecure information on the actual demand, one
may hypothesize that they face a more difficult job when deciding about their bidding
strategy, which leads to lower profits. However, our data do not exhibit a significant
difference in average profits across the information conditions, as figure 7 shows. The
figure plots the average round profit of the two peakload generators in the second half of
the experiment. In five of eight set-ups in the uniform auction and in only two cases
under the discriminatory format we observe higher peakload generator profits in the
control condition with full information. Thus, the data do not allow us to reject the null
hypothesis of equal profit opportunities for peakload generators under either of the
auction designs when there is full information.
However, in the case of asymmetric information, peakload producers would prefer a
discriminatory auction format, which leads to higher profits for them than observed in the
corresponding market using the uniform design. This difference is significant at α = 0.05




As shown in figure 8 baseload generators do not profit from the discriminatory format in
the same way. Here, no pair wise comparison between information treatments nor
between auction conditions yields a significant difference.
Why are uninformed peakload generators better off in a pay-bid auction? There seem to
be two relevant factors. First, the average market price tends to be very similar in both
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 We would like to thank the anonymous referee for this interpretation.








































institutions, as we have seen in earlier sections. However, while the uniform auction
specifies a single price for all units, in the discriminatory auction different prices can
prevail for different units. Thus, given a very similar average, some units sell at lower,
some at higher prices than they would in a uniform auction. In the present setting, this
feature tends to favor peakload generators.
This is so because they tend to submit higher bids than the baseload generators. Figure 9
shows the difference in the average bid submitted by the baseload and the peakload
producers. With uninformed high cost bidders, we observe a higher average bid of the
peakload generators in all eight set-ups. This implies that they tend to sell more often at
the prices that are higher than the single price in the uniform auction would be.
Figure 9
An analogous result for the control treatment with fully informed peakload generators
cannot be found, which is consistent with the observation that here peakload operators are
not significantly better off in the discriminatory than in the uniform auction.
5.5. Collusion
The fear of possible collusive behavior among the bidders is an important issue in the
design of trading mechanisms. This concern is fuelled by the repeated game these trading
mechanisms inherently establish. The question arises whether collusive behavior can be
identified in our data, and whether it is more likely to occur in one of the trading
mechanisms. Our data do not allow us to answer this question in a conclusive way.
Collusive behavior should express itself in sustainable high market prices. Figure 3
























indeed shows that in some markets average market prices are extraordinarily high (set-
ups 5 and 6 in Asym-Dis, or set-ups 2 and 3 in Comp-Dis). Interestingly, the four markets
with the highest average market prices are all found in the discriminatory treatment,
which may suggest that the discriminatory format is more susceptible to collusion than
the uniform auction. However, these occurrences are still too sparse to judge whether the
discriminatory format systematically encourages collusive behavior in an environment
like the present.
6. Conclusions
Restructuring of electricity industries has created a more decentralized market place
where agents of different sizes, incumbency, and levels of vertical integration compete to
buy and sell power. In some markets (for example, England and Wales) demand forecast
which were once primarily the responsibility of one central agent are increasingly being
made at the company level. The required drain on company resources to meet this new
responsibility is not equal for all companies and one might therefore expect that the
degree of forecast accuracy will likewise vary among them. Debates on industry
restructuring regularly fail to address the issue of such informational asymmetries among
agents even though policy makers generally claim to be in favor of non-discriminatory
market rules.
In England and Wales the movement toward more decentralized demand forecasting has
been accompanied by a change from uniform payments to generators to discriminatory
payments. As in other contexts (such as the sell of treasury bills) the desirability of
discriminatory versus uniform pricing in the electricity industry has been debated.
In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to compare outcomes such as prices,
profitability, and efficiency when sellers are asymmetrically informed about market
demand. We make these comparisons under two different payment rules for sellers:
uniform prices and discriminatory prices. We do not find a significant effect when we
look at average prices under the two pricing rules, but efficiency is significantly lower
with discriminatory prices when the market is populated by asymmetrically informed
sellers. We observe that the cut-off prices – which determine the marginal unit to be
traded – are significantly higher under the pay-bid scheme. Thus, the discriminatory
auction is more likely to leave part of the possible surplus unrealized and create more
price peaks relative to uniform pricing. The beneficiaries are the high cost peaking
stations who profit from higher cut-off prices.
We do not obtain significant results between the uniform and discriminatory auctions
when there is full demand information for both high and low cost sellers. The efficiency
and profitability differences only arise when there is asymmetric information. This alone
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gives reason for further research and debate in the electricity industry taking fully into
account the informational differences that exist among agents. Moreover, our results do
not support the claim often made in favor of discriminatory pricing that consumer prices
will be lower and less volatile. We find no significant difference in average prices or
volatility under the two pricing rules, and price spikes are more frequent with
discriminatory pricing when information is asymmetric. Finally, our results lend some
support to the argument made by Kahn et al. (2001) that discriminatory auctions can
result in inefficient dispatch.
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Appendix I. Instructions
(translated from the Spanish original)
This is the version for the Asym-Disc treatment. The differences with respect to the instructions
for the other treatments are indicated in brackets.
General information:
Thank you for showing up for the experiment. In this experiment there will be 30 rounds. In each
of these rounds you will participate in a market in which you will be one of the sellers of a
fictitious good. In each round you will be in a group with another three participants. The groups
will remain constant during the 30 rounds.
Decisions of the sellers:
In each round each seller will be able to make selling price offers for a number of units of a good.
The selling offers may be different for different units. The selling offers will be made separately
by each seller. During each round of the experiment each seller will be able to sell between 0 and
4 units. Each seller will have costs which will depend on the number of units that he sells.
With respect to costs there will be two types of sellers. Two of the four sellers in each group will
be of type A and will have the following costs:






Observe that for each number of units total costs are shown. This means that, for instance, the
total cost of producing 3 units is 20.
The other two sellers in a group will be of type B and will have the following costs:
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Decisions of the buyers:
In this experiment the decisions of the buyers will not be made by participants in the experiment,
rather they will be made by the computer. The decisions that the computer will make for the
buyers are the following. In each round the computer will make buying price offers for X units at
a price of 100, for another two units at the price of 55 and for another two units at a price of 30.
Information about the quantity X:
At the beginning of each round the quantity X will be determined randomly. X will be, with equal
probability, one of the six whole numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10. (In the treatments with complete
information the rest of this section was replaced by the following sentence: “At the beginning of
each round the sellers will be informed about the exact value of X.” ). At the beginning of each
round the sellers will receive information about the value of X. This information will be different
for the sellers of type A than for the sellers of type B. The sellers of type A will be informed of
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the exact value of X. The sellers of type B will not be informed of the exact value of X, rather
they will receive an estimate of X. They will receive the information that X is:
• low, i.e., with equal probability 5, 6 or 7 or that it is
• high, i.e., with equal probability 8, 9 or 10.
In addition, this estimate will not be true with a probability of 100%, but only of 80%. This means
that when X is 5, 6 or 7 a seller of type B will receive with an 80% probability an estimate that X
is 5, 6 or 7 and with a probability of 20% an estimate that X is 8, 9 or 10. In the same way, if X is
8, 9 or 10 then a seller of type B will receive with an 80% probability the estimate that X is 8, 9 or
10 and with a probability of 20% the estimate that X is 5, 6 or 7. Each seller of type B will
receive his/her estimate separately.
The market rules:
We will now explain how it is determined which units will be exchanged in a market round and at
which price.
In each round we will order the selling price offers from smaller to larger for each group of four
sellers. This means that for each group the first unit that will be offered for sale will be the one
corresponding to the lowest selling offer. The second unit that will offered for sale will be the
second lowest and so on. If several units are offered at the same price they will be ordered
randomly. An example of an ordering of selling offers can be seen in figure 1.
In each round we will order the buying offers from larger to smaller. This means that the first
buying offers will be those of the X units at 100. After that we will order the buying offers of the
two units at 55 and then those of the two units at 30. This ordering of buying offers can be seen in
figure 2.
For each round the price and the units sold will be determined in the following way. Starting from
the ordering of selling offers from smaller to larger and from that of buying offers from larger to
smaller, all those units will be sold for which the selling offer is not larger than the buying offer
and the prices received for each of the units will be the ones corresponding to the selling offers of
each of those units. (In the uniform auction treatments this last part of the sentence was replaced
by the statement: “…and the price that will be received for each of the units sold, called market
price, will be the one corresponding to the last unit sold.”). The price corresponding to the selling
offer of the last unit sold will be called the cutoff-price.
Graphically the units sold are given by the intersection between the orderings of the selling offers
and of the buying offers. An example can be seen in figure 3. (For the uniform auction treatments
the last sentence was replaced by: “Graphically the units sold and the price that will be received
are given by the intersection between the orderings of the selling offers and of the buying offers.
An example can be seen in figure 3.”).
The cutoff price and the units sold will depend of the selling offers made by the four sellers of a
group and on the randomly determined value of X. (For the uniform auction treatments the term
‘cutoff price’ was replaced by ‘market price’).
Profits and losses:
Your profit or loss in a round will be equal, for the units that you have sold, to your selling offers,
each of them multiplied by the number of units sold minus the cost corresponding to the number
of units that you have sold. (For the uniform auction treatments the last sentence was replaced
by: “Your profit or loss in a round will be equal to the market price multiplied by the number of
units sold minus the cost corresponding to the number of units that you have sold.”).
Information that you will receive:
At the end of each round you will be informed about the cutoff price (market price in the uniform
auction treatments), about the number of units sold by each of the sellers, about your earnings
and about the exact value of X (unknown to sellers of type B at the moment at which they make




The currency used in this experiment is the taler, so that all the buying and selling offers and all
the prices will be in talers. At the beginning of the experiment each seller will receive a capital
balance of 200 talers. Your total earnings from your participation in this experiment will be equal
to the sum of all your profits and your capital balance minus your losses. If at any moment in the
experiment your earnings became negative you will not be allowed to continue participating in
the experiment. At any moment in the experiment you will be able to check your total earnings in
talers on the screen. At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be converted into
pesetas. For sellers of type A the exchange rate will be 1 peseta per taler. For sellers of type B the
exchange rate will be 4 pesetas per taler.
From this moment on any kind of communication with other participants is not allowed. If you
have a question, please, raise your hand and one of us will come to your table to answer it.
quantity
price
Figure 1
25
quantity
price
Figure 3
quantity
price
Figure 2
